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On the Physical Interpretation of Partial Traces:
Two Nonstandard Viewpoints
Claudio Garola∗ and Sandro Sozzo†
Abstract
Mixed states are introduced in physics in order to express our ignorance
about the actual state of a physical system and are represented in stan-
dard quantum mechanics (QM) by density operators. Such operators also
appear if one considers a (pure) entangled state of a compound system
Ω and performs partial traces on the projection operator representing it.
Yet, they do not represent mixed states (or proper mixtures) of the subsys-
tems in this case, but improper mixtures, since the coefficients in the con-
vex sums expressing them never bear the ignorance interpretation. Hence,
one cannot attribute states to the subsystems of a compound physical sys-
tem in QM (subentity problem). We discuss here two alternative proposals
that can be worked out within the Brussels and Lecce approaches. We
firstly summarize the general framework provided by the former, which
suggests that improper mixtures could be considered as new pure states.
Then, we show that improper mixtures can be considered as true (yet
nonpure) states also according to the latter. The two proposals seem to
be compatible notwithstanding their different terminologies.
Key Words: quantum mechanics; improper mixtures; subentity prob-
lem; Brussels approach; Lecce approach; semantic realism.
1 Introduction
In the standard formulation of quantum mechanics (QM) a physical system
Ω is associated with a separable complex Hilbert space H and the states of
Ω are represented by density operators on H, which reduce to one–dimensional
(orthogonal) projection operators in the case of pure states. Every density oper-
ator W representing a mixed state, or proper mixture, S of Ω can be expressed
in many ways as a convex combination of pure states, and a decomposition
W =
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi| exists in which every coefficient pi denotes the probability
that Ω is in the state Si represented by the projection operator |ψi〉〈ψi|. This
probability expresses our ignorance about the real state of Ω, hence also about
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the result of a measurement testing whether the property Ei of Ω represented by
|ψi〉〈ψi| is possessed by Ω. Yet, if 〈ψi|ψj〉 = δij , every Ei is objective in S, in the
sense that it can be considered as either possessed or not possessed by Ω indepen-
dently of any measurement. Indeed, the former case occurs if the real state of Ω
is Si, the latter case if the real state is Sj , with j 6= i. Now, let Ω be a compound
system, made up by two subsystems Ω1 and Ω2, in a pure entangled state SP
represented by the projection operator |ψ〉〈ψ|. Let |ψ〉 = ∑i
√
pi|φi(1)〉|χi(2)〉
(where 0 6= pi, and pi 6= 1 since SP is entangled) be the biorthogonal decom-
position of |ψ〉, so that |ψ〉〈ψ| = ∑i,j
√
pipj |φi(1)〉〈φj(1)| ⊗ |χi(2)〉〈χj(2)|. If
one considers Ω1 only, the physical information provided by QM on it can be
attained by performing the partial trace of |ψ〉〈ψ| with respect to Ω2, thus get-
ting W1 = Tr2|ψ〉〈ψ| =
∑
i pi|φi(1)〉〈φi(1)|, and applying standard quantum
rules. The density operator W1 is formally similar to W . Yet, a coefficient
pi in it denotes the probability of actualizing the property Ei(1) of Ω repre-
sented by the projection operator |φi(1)〉〈φi(1)| ⊗ I2 whenever a measurement
occurs (or the transition probability from SP to the pure state represented
by |φi(1)〉〈φi(1)| ⊗ |χi(2)〉〈χi(2)| if the measurement is ideal), but it cannot
denote the probability that Ω1 actually is in the state Si(1) represented by
|φi(1)〉〈φi(1)|. Indeed, Ei(1) should then be objective, as the property Ei con-
sidered above, while it is nonobjective in SP according to the standard inter-
pretation of QM (that is, one cannot consider E(1) as either possessed or not
possessed by Ω in the state SP if a measurement is not performed).
1 Basing on
this conclusion, one can show that no decomposition ofW1 bears the above igno-
rance interpretation. Hence, some authors say that W1 represents an improper
mixture, distinguishing it from a proper mixture as W (see, e.g., [1]–[3]).
It follows from the above reasonings that the density operators obtained by
performing partial traces generally neither represent pure nor mixed states of the
component subsystems in standard QM, so that these subsystems can never be
considered as independent entities, which raises the so–called subentity problem.
In particular, two distinct approaches to the foundations of QM are directly or
indirectly concerned with the solution of this problem, namely, the Brussels and
the Lecce approach. Indeed, the former (briefly, BR approach), elaborated by
Aerts and his collaborators in Brussels in the last two decades, continues the
work started by Jauch and Piron in the sixties and the seventies in Geneva [8, 9],
with the aim of providing not only a physical justification of the mathematical
apparatus of QM by means of an operational foundation of this theory, but
also a better description of compound entities by introducing some changes in
the theory itself. The Lecce approach, instead, basing on a criticism of the
theorems that are maintained to prove the nonobjectivity of the theory, offers
1Nonobjectivity is commonly believed to be an intrinsic and uneliminable feature of QM
because of some mathematical results, as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem (that proves the
contextuality of QM, which means that the result of the measurement of a property of a
physical system in a given state is not prefixed, but depends on the measurement context)
[4, 5], and the Bell theorem (that proves the nonlocality of QM, which means that contextuality
occurs also at a distance) [6]. Yet, it is the deep root of most problems that afflict the standard
interpretation of QM and generates a lot of paradoxes and conceptual difficulties (in particular,
the objectification problem in the quantum theory of measurement, see, e.g., [3, 7]).
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a non–standard interpretation of QM (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation)
that is local and noncontextual (it preserves anyway the mathematical apparatus
of QM and its statistical interpretation) with the aim of avoiding the paradoxes
that afflict standard QM. Then, this framework provides also the basic elements
for a solution of the subentity problem.
We note that the foregoing approaches have a number of common features,
and seem to come to the same conclusions about many problematical issues
of QM [10, 11]. In particular, both the BR and the Lecce approach suggest
that a broader theory can exist that embodies QM but says more than it. Here,
however, we are only concerned with a comparison of the nonstandard proposals
emerging from the two approaches for a solution of the subentity problem. To
this end, we resume in Sec. 2 the essentials of the BR approach, and discuss in
Sec. 3 a possible solution of the subentity problem within this approach, which
may entail a breakdown of the linearity of QM. Then we briefly present the
Lecce approach in Sec. 4, and show in Sec. 5 that a solution of the subentity
problem can be worked out also within this approach. Both solutions propose
considering improper mixtures as new states of the physical system, hence they
seem to be compatible, despite their different terminologies.
2 The Brussels approach
We supply in this section a summary of the basic features of the BR approach
that are required for discussing a solution of the subentity problem [12]–[17] pro-
pounded by this approach. Our presentation is synthetic and partially original,
hence possible defects or misunderstandings must be charged to ourselves.
Within the BR approach, the term physical entity is preferred to the stan-
dard term physical system used so far. Then, let Ω be a physical entity. Ac-
cording to the BR approach, Ω is a state property entity iff it is associated with
a set of states Σ and a set of properties L. A state p of Ω intuitively represents
a “mode of being” of Ω. This means that at each moment the entity Ω “is” in a
specific state p ∈ Σ. A property a of Ω is an attribute of Ω. The property a can
be actual in the state p, which means that p is such that Ω has (or possesses) the
property a “in acto”, or potential, which means that p is such that Ω does not
possess the property a, but can acquire it. Hence, a mapping ρ : Σ×L → {A,P}
(where A stands for actual and P for potential) can be introduced. Thus, if the
entity Ω is in a state p, one can consider the set ξ(p) = {a ∈ L | ρ(p, a) = A} of
all properties that are actual in p. Analogously, for a property a of Ω, one can
consider the set κ(a) = {p ∈ Σ | ρ(p, a) = A} of all states that make a actual.
Hence, for every p ∈ Σ and a ∈ L, ρ(p, a) = A iff a ∈ ξ(p), or p ∈ k(a).
Let Ω be a state property entity and let a, b ∈ L. If, for every p ∈ Σ,
ρ(p, a) = A implies ρ(p, b) = A, one says that a implies b and writes a < b
(hence a < b iff κ(a) ⊆ κ(b)). It is easy to see that < is a preorder relation on
L. Analogously, let p, q ∈ Σ. If for every a ∈ L, ρ(q, a) = A implies ρ(p, a) = A,
then one says that p property implies q and writes p < q (hence p < q iff
ξ(q) ⊆ ξ(p)). It is easy to see that < is a preorder relation on Σ.
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The above remarks suggest introducing the following definition (where, for
every set K, P(K) denotes the power set of K).
Definition 1. Let Ω be a state property entity characterized by a set of states
Σ, a set of properties L, and two mappings ξ : p ∈ Σ → ξ(p) ∈ P(L) and κ :
a ∈ L → κ(a) ∈ P(Σ) (where ξ(p) denotes the set of properties that are actual
if the entity Ω is in the state p and κ(a) the set of states in which the property
a is actual). For every p, q ∈ Σ and a, b ∈ L, we put p < q iff ξ(q) ⊆ ξ(p), a < b
iff κ(a) ⊆ κ(b), and say that Ω is described by the structure (Σ, <,L, <, ξ, κ)
(briefly, (Σ,L, ξ, κ)). Furthermore, we say that (Σ,L, ξ, κ) is a state property
system iff (L, <) is a complete lattice (whose meet and join we denote by ∧ and
∨, respectively), and the following conditions hold for every p ∈ Σ.
(i) Let I and 0 be the maximal and minimal elements of (L, <), respectively.
Then, I ∈ ξ(p) and 0 6∈ ξ(p).
(ii) Let {ai ∈ L}i∈I be a family of elements of L. Then, ∧iai ∈ ξ(p) iff, for
every i ∈ I, ai ∈ ξ(p).
Following Aerts, we suppose from now on that every physical entity Ω con-
sidered here is described by a state property system. One can then prove that
the standard formalism of QM can be recovered by adding suitable axioms on
the state property system (Σ,L, ξ, κ). We firstly collect all the required axioms
in the following definition.
Definition 2. Let (Σ,L, ξ, κ) be a state property system, and let A be the set
of all atoms of the lattice (L, <).
(i) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the state determination axiom if, for every p, q ∈ Σ,∧
a∈ξ(p) a =
∧
b∈ξ(q) b implies p = q.
(ii) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the atomicity axiom if, for every p ∈ Σ, the element∧
a∈ξ(p) a is an atom of (L, <).
(iii) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the orthocomplementation axiom if (L, <) is ortho-
complemented, that is, there exists a mapping ′ : L → L such that, for every
a, b ∈ L, (a′)′ = a, a < b implies b′ < a′, a ∧ a′ = 0 and a ∨ a′ = I.
(iv) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the covering law axiom if, for every a, x ∈ L, and
b ∈ A, a < x < a ∨ b implies either x = a or x = a ∨ b.
(v) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the weak modularity axiom if (L, <) is orthocomple-
mented and, for every a, b ∈ L, a < b implies (b ∧ a′) ∨ a = b.
(vi) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the plane transitivity axiom if, for every s, t ∈ A,
there exist two distinct atoms s1, s2 ∈ A and an automorphism f on L such that
t = f(s) and, for every a ∈ [0, s1 ∨ s2], f(a) = a.
(vii) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the irreducibility axiom if (L, <) is orthocomple-
mented and, for every b ∈ L, b = (b ∧ a) ∨ (b ∧ a′) ∀a ∈ L, implies either b = 0
or b = I.
(viii) (Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfies the infinite length axiom if (L, <) is orthocomple-
mented and contains an infinite set of mutually orthogonal elements (where
b, c ∈ L are mutually orthogonal iff a property a ∈ L exists such that b < a and
c < a′).
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The following representation theorem can now be proved.
Theorem 1. Let Ω be a physical entity described by the state property system
(Σ,L, ξ, κ) satisfying all the axioms in Definition 2. Then, (L, <) is isomor-
phic to the complete lattice (L(H),⊆) of the projection operators on an infi-
nite dimensional real, complex or quaternionic Hilbert space H. The atoms of
(L(H),⊆) ( i.e., the one–dimensional projection operators on H) are in a one–
to–one correspondence with the atoms of (L, <) and with the elements of Σ.2
The orthocomplementation is induced by the orthogonality structure of H.
The representation theorem stated above makes it possible to recover the
standard quantum formalism from the operational structure of state property
system introduced by the BR approach. The problem of proving it engaged
a number of scholars, and its solution gave an end to the so–called coordina-
tization problem [18]. The proof is long and complicated and requires some
important mathematical results, such as the Piron representation theorem [9],
the fundamental theorem of projective geometry [19], the Sole`r theorem [20]
and the Gleason theorem [21]. The final result is relevant, since it provides a
(partial) operational justification of the standard formalism of QM, which thus
seems more firmly founded. But, then, a new problem occurs. Indeed, it is
well known that QM meets some difficulties whenever one wants to apply it to
compound entities. Therefore, we dedicate the next section to this issue.
3 The subentity problem within the Brussels
approach
In order to discuss the subentity problem we must preliminary introduce a re-
mark on the representation theorem stated in Sec. 2. To be precise, we stress
that this theorem establishes a one–to–one correspondence between the atoms
of (L(H),⊆) and the elements of Σ, which implies that Σ does not contain
mixed states. Hence, all axioms in Definition 2 refer to a state property system
for which only pure states are considered. This is consistent with the intu-
itive notion of state as a “mode of being” of the entity Ω. According to the
BR approach, the reality of a quantum entity in QM is expressed by a pure
state, represented by a one–dimensional projection operator of the correspond-
ing Hilbert space. Proper mixtures have obviously been taken into account
within the BR approach, but they are not classified as modes of being of the
entity, since they do not represent the reality of the entity but a lack of knowl-
edge about this reality. Indeed, the probabilities that appear in them express
(as in the standard interpretation of QM, see Sec. 1) our subjective ignorance
about the actual state of the entity [14].
2Note that the existence of a one–to–one mapping of Σ onto A follows from the atomicity
axiom. This axiom is sometimes replaced by a weaker axiom within the BR approach (see,
e.g., [15]), so that the set Σ must be substituted by the subset Λ of all atoms of (Σ, <) (or
atomic states) in Theorem 1. We have chosen here the stronger statement for the sake of
simplicity.
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Let us come to the definition of subentity according to the BR approach.
Firstly, let Ω and Ω′ be two physical entities described by the state property
systems (Σ,L, ξ, κ) and (Σ′,L′, ξ′, κ′), respectively. If Ω is to be a subentity of
Ω′, it is reasonable to demand that, if Ω′ is in a state p′, then Ω, as part of Ω′,
is in a state m(p′). The mapping m that is thus introduced should be surjective
(each state of Ω corresponds to at least one state of Ω′) but not necessarily
injective (different states of Ω′ can correspond to the same state of Ω).
Secondly, if Ω is to be a subentity of Ω′, each property a of Ω should corre-
spond to a property n(a) of Ω′. The mapping n that is thus introduced should
be injective (if two properties of Ω are different, they are also different when are
considered as properties of Ω′) but not necessarily surjective (there are proper-
ties of Ω′ that do not correspond to properties of Ω).
Finally, if the property a is actual when Ω is in the state m(p′), then the
property n(a) should be actual when Ω′ is in the state p′ (covariance principle,
see, e.g., [15]).
Because of the above arguments the BR approach provides a definition of
subentity that can be summarized as follows.
Definition 3. Let Ω and Ω′ be two physical entities described by the state prop-
erty systems (Σ,L, ξ, κ) and (Σ′,L′, ξ′, κ′), respectively. We say that Ω is a
subentity of Ω′ iff there exists a surjective mapping m : p′ ∈ Σ′ → m(p′) ∈ Σ
and an injective mapping n : a ∈ L → n(a) ∈ L′, such that, for every p′ ∈ Σ′
and a ∈ L, a ∈ ξ(m(p′)) iff n(a) ∈ ξ′(p′).
Let us now consider QM. Because of the representation theorem, all elements
of a state property system satisfying the axioms in Definition 2 can be repre-
sented within the standard mathematical apparatus of QM. In particular, the
notion of subentity can be restated in QM by substituting Σ with the set of all
atoms of (L(H),⊆), and L with the set of all projection operators of (L(H),⊆).
But, then, one can prove that the subsystems of a compound system (or entity
according to the terminology of the BR approach) are not subentities in the
sense of Definition 3. In fact, let Ω and Ω′ be two quantum entities associated
with the Hilbert spaces H and H′, respectively, and suppose that Ω is a sub-
system of Ω′, so that H′ = H⊗G (where G is another Hilbert space). A (pure)
state of Ω is represented by a one–dimensional projection operator Pψ on H,
while a (pure) state of Ω′ is represented by a one–dimensional projection opera-
tor P ′ψ′ on H′. Moreover, each property of the subsystem Ω is represented by a
projection operator P on H and corresponds to the property of Ω′ represented
by P ′ = P ⊗ IG (where IG is the identity operator on G). Bearing in mind our
remarks at the beginning of this section and the standard results mentioned in
Sec. 1, one concludes at once that the mapping m in Definition 3 cannot exist
in this case. Indeed, a correspondence between a pure state p′ of Ω′ and a pure
state m(p′) of Ω satisfying the conditions in Definition 3 can be given iff p′ is
a product state. Thus, Ω is not a subentity of Ω′ in the sense established in
Definition 3, which proves our statement.
The above result shows that the standard quantum formalism cannot de-
scribe consistently physical entities made up by subentities. Yet, it seems rea-
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sonable to admit that entities of this kind exist. Hence, one meets the subentity
problem: can one complete QM so that entities and subentities can be plainly
described within the enlarged formalism?
According to Aerts [14, 15], the subentity problem was known from the
early days of QM but it was more or less concealed by the confusion that often
exists in the literature between proper and improper mixtures. Indeed, many
texts and manuals on QM (see, e.g., [8, 22]) write that, whenever a compound
system is in a pure nonproduct state, the subsystems are in mixed states and not
in pure states: namely, the mixed states represented by the density operators
obtained by performing partial traces. The statement that the subsystems,
although they are not in a pure state, are at least in a mixed state, seems at
first sight to offer a partial solution of the subentity problem in QM. Yet, this
statement is incorrect, since it neglects the conceptual difference between proper
and improper mixtures that we have pointed out in Sec. 1.
The solution of the subentity problem propounded by the BR approach that
we want to discuss here3 is rather radical and consists in interpreting improper
mixtures as pure states within a more general framework, in which completed
quantum entities take the place of the quantum entities introduced above. We
will not resume the BR treatment, since this would require many preliminary
notions that have not been introduced in Sec. 2. Rather, we provide a new
treatment that seems to us to recover the essentials of the BR proposal (the
notion of completed quantum entity is however more general within the BR
framework). To this end, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4. Let Ω be a physical entity. We say that Ω is a completed quan-
tum entity iff the state property system (Σ,L, ξ, κ) describing it admits a canon-
ical representation on a separable complex Hilbert space H such that:
(i) (Σ, <) is order–isomorphic to the preordered set (W(H), <) of all den-
sity operators on H (here < denotes both the preorder on Σ and the canonical
mathematical preorder on W(H) induced by inclusion of ranges);
(ii) (L, <) is order–isomorphic to the complete lattice (L(H),⊆) of all pro-
jection operators on H;
(iii) mixed states of Ω are represented by convex sums of density operators
in W(H) (hence still by density operators).
By comparing Definition 4 with Theorem 1 we see that, from a standard
quantum viewpoint, a completed quantum entity is characterized by a broader
set of pure states with respect to a standard quantum entity, since every density
operator represents a pure state.4 The introduction of completed quantum
entities provides a plain solution of the subentity problem. Indeed, whenever
a completed compound quantum entity Ω′ is in the pure state pW represented
3We note that this solution is not unique within the BR approach. An alternative solution
was indeed discussed in a number of articles by Aerts and his collaborators (see, e.g., Ref.
[16]), which is however rather conventional and does not interest us here.
4Pure states that are represented by density operators which do not reduce to projec-
tion operators are also called density states within the BR approach. We do not use this
terminology here since we do not need to distinguish between the two kinds of pure states.
7
by the density operator W , performing partial traces on W produces density
operators that can be interpreted as representing pure states of the component
subsystems. It is then intuitively obvious, and it can be mathematically proved
[14], that all conditions in Definition 3 are fulfilled if Ω is a component subsystem
of Ω′, so that Ω is a subentity of Ω′ and the subentity problem disappears.
The completion of QM propounded above in order to solve the subentity
problem (which can be considered a step in the search for a solution of a more
general problem, the problem of generalizing QM so that also separated quantum
entities can be described by the new theory [12, 13, 17]) puts several interesting
new questions. Let us briefly sketch some of them.
(i) Let Ω be a completed quantum entity and pW a pure state of Ω repre-
sented by the density operator W . Then, W can be expressed in many ways as
a convex sum of projection operators. Yet, the coefficients that appear in the
sum can never be interpreted as probabilities expressing our ignorance on the
real state of Ω, as it occurs when W represents a proper mixture in standard
QM. They can be interpreted, instead, as probabilities of actualizing particular
properties, or as transition probabilities, as in the case of improper mixtures in
standard QM (see Sec. 1). This enlights a shortcoming of the mathematical
formalism used by the theory, namely, the Hilbert space model. Indeed, states
having different physical interpretations are represented by the same mathemat-
ical objects within this formalism.
(ii) More generally, the representation of mixed states introduced in Defini-
tion 4 implies that every mixed state is represented by a density operator on H,
which makes even deeper the problem pointed out in (i). According to Aerts,
if one accepts that the set of pure states of a physical entity is represented by
the set of all density operators, then this set should no longer be represented
in a linear space, and this entails a breakdown of the superposition principle.
Hence, the solution of the subentity problem within the BR perspective “puts
the linearity of QM at stake” [17].
(iii) One can assume that the probabilistic transition from a pure to a mixed
state occurring whenever a measurement is performed follows standard quantum
rules (Lu¨ders formula), which entails that the new pure states introduced here
cannot be empirically distinguished from the mixed states represented by the
same density operators. This might foster the opinion that the BR solution
of the subentity problem is theoretically interesting but empirically irrelevant.
However, it is well known that the density operators obtained by performing
partial traces in the case of a compound entity in an entangled state do not
evolve unitarily. This suggests that pure states represented by density operators
may evolve in a different way with respect to mixed states represented by the
same density operators. Hence Aerts writes “If we would be able to realize
experimentally a nonlinear evolution of one of the subentities that has been
brought into an entangled state with the other subentity as subentity of a joint
entity, it would be possible to test our hypothesis and to detect experimentally
whether density states are pure states or mixtures” [16].
(iv) The operational justification of the standard formalism of QM sum-
marized in Sec. 2 must be modified whenever completed quantum entities are
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considered. To be precise, the state property system describing an entity of this
kind cannot satisfy all axioms in Definition 2, since in this case no density state
could exist. Bearing in mind our comments in (ii), one is led to challenge the
axiom from which linearity and superposition principle follow, namely, the cov-
ering law axiom.5 Dealing with these topics goes, however, beyond the scopes
of the present paper.
4 The Lecce approach
The BR solution of the subentity problem presented in Sec. 3 is interesting but
exposed to a number of objections. In particular, the introduction of states as
“modes of being” of an entity may sound “metaphysical” and be irritating for
many pragmatically oriented physicists. On the other hand, this notion of state
is not theoretically irrelevant, since the assumption that a surjective mapping
exists in Definition 3 follows from it, which could induce some scholars to reject
Definition 3 and conclude that subentities in the sense specified there simply
do not exist (this alternative has been seriously considered by the BR approach
itself, see footnote 3). Therefore, as we have anticipated in Sec. 1, we want to
compare the solution in Sec. 3 with another solution that can be worked out
within the Lecce approach [23]–[31]. Hence, we summarize in this section some
basic features of the Lecce approach that are needed in order to attain this goal.
For the sake of brevity, we proceed by steps.
(i) A physical entity Ω is associated with a set Π of preparing devices and a set
R of registering devices which characterize the entity. A preparing device pi ∈ Π
when constructed and activated, performs a preparation of an individual sample
of Ω (briefly, a physical object). A registering device r ∈ R, when constructed
and activated after a preparation, performs a registration and yields one of two
possible outcomes, say yes and no.
(ii) Any actual setting is localized in some physical laboratory j, where all
preparations and all registrations can be repeated in different times. Abstractly
speaking, j can be considered as a space–time domain. Let us denote the set
of all laboratories by J . A preparing device pi ∈ Π can be activated a great
number of times in any laboratory in order to prepare ensembles of physical
objects. If every physical object in each ensemble is tested by means of a
device r ∈ R immediately after the preparation, one obtains a frequency for
the outcome yes (or no) in each ensemble. Then, we assume that preparing
and registering devices are chosen in such a way that, for every pair (pi, r),
these frequencies approach a limit whenever ensembles with increasing numbers
of physical objects are considered, and that this limit is the same in every
laboratory.
(iii) Let pi1, pi2 ∈ Π and let Φ1 and Φ2 be two ensembles of physical objects
prepared by means of pi1 and pi2, respectively, in a laboratory j. We say that pi1
and pi2 are physically equivalent iff every r ∈ R, when applied to the physical
5It is interesting to note that if one wants a generalization of QM that can describe sepa-
rated quantum entities, also the weak modularity axiom is “put at stake” [12, 13, 17].
9
objects in Φ1 and Φ2, yields the outcome yes with frequencies that approach the
same limit (for increasing numbers of physical objects) in both ensembles and
in every laboratory. This relation of physical equivalence canonically induces
a partition of Π. We call states the elements of this partition, and denote the
set of all states by S in the following. We stress that this operational definition
does not distinguish between pure and mixed states.
(iv) One can consider the set of all physical objects that are prepared by
means of preparing devices belonging to Π in a laboratory j: this set is called
the domain Dj of j.
(v) One can consider, in the domain Dj of the laboratory j, the subset of all
physical objects that are prepared by activating repeatedly a preparing device
pi: this set is the extension ρj(pi) of pi in j. Then, the extension ρj(S) of a state
S in j is defined as the join of all ρj(pi), with pi ∈ S.
(vi) Let r1, r2 ∈ R and let Φ1 and Φ2 be two ensembles of physical objects
prepared by means of the same preparing device pi in a laboratory j. We say
that r1 and r2 are physically equivalent iff, when applied to the physical objects
in Φ1 and Φ2, respectively, they yield the outcome yes with frequencies that
approach the same limit (for increasing numbers of physical objects) in both
ensembles and in every laboratory, whatever pi may be. This relation of physical
equivalence canonically induces a partition of R. We call effects the elements of
this partition. Within the set of all effects a subset of exact effects, or properties,
can be selected, whose elements are classes of ideal registering devices. We
denote the set of all properties by E in the following.
(vii) One assumes that, in the domain Dj of the laboratory j, the subset
is defined of all physical objects that would yield the outcome yes if tested
by means of a given registering device r immediately after the preparation:
this is the extension ρj(r) of r in j. Moreover, let r1 and r2 be registering
devices. Whenever ρj(r1) = ρj(r2) in every laboratory j, r1 and r2 are obviously
equivalent in the sense specified in (vi); yet, the converse implication does not
hold a priori. Therefore, one introduces the further assumption that r1 and r2
are equivalent iff, for every j ∈ J, ρj(r1) = ρj(r2).
(viii) By using the assumptions in (vii) one can introduce, for every E ∈ E
and j ∈ J , an extension ρj(E) of E in j by setting ρj(E) = ρj(r), with r ∈ E.
(ix) For every, j ∈ J , the extensions ρj(S1) and ρj(S2) of two different states
S1 and S2 must have empty intersection, since the objects in ρj(S1) are prepared
by devices that are not equivalent to the devices that prepare ρj(S2). On the
other hand, since every physical object in Dj is prepared by some preparing
device (see (iv)), the set of extensions of all possible states in any laboratory j
has to exhaust the domain Dj . In other words, the set S of all states induces,
for every j ∈ J , a partition of Dj . It follows, in particular, that two states
S1 and S2 coincide iff for every j ∈ J , ρj(S1) = ρj(S2). Moreover, if one
introduces a distinction between pure and nonpure states (see Sec. 5, (ii)) the
extensions of a pure and of a nonpure state never overlap, which makes the
Lecce approach essentially different from other approaches to the foundations
of QM, as Ludwig’s [32].
(x) We say that a physical object in the state S produces the outcome yes
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for every registering device in the property E with certainty iff, for every j ∈ J ,
ρj(S) ⊆ ρj(E). Hence, one can introduce, for every S ∈ S and E ∈ E , the
certainly true domain Et(S) of S and the certainly yes domain Sy(E) of E,
defined as follows.
Et(S) = {E ∈ E | for every j ∈ J, ρj(S) ⊆ ρj(E)} , (1)
Sy(E) = {S ∈ S | for every j ∈ J, ρj(S) ⊆ ρj(E)} . (2)
Obviously, for every S ∈ S and E ∈ E , E ∈ Et(S) iff S ∈ Sy(E). Moreover, if
we put, for every E,F ∈ E , E ≤ F iff Sy(E) ⊆ Sy(F ), and for every S, T ∈ S,
S ≤ T iff Et(T ) ⊆ Et(S), we get that (E ,≤) and (S,≤) are preordered sets.
(xi) The definitions in (x) entail that an entity Ω which is characterized
by the set S, the set E , and the mappings Et : S → Et(S) ⊆ P(E) and Sy :
E → Sy(E) ⊆ P(S) (where P(E) and P(S) denote the power sets of E and S,
respectively) is a state property entity in the sense established in Sec. 2. We
assume in the following that the structure (S, E , Et,Sy) also is a state property
system (of course, this feature of (S, E , Et,Sy) can be obtained as a consequence
of weaker assumptions within the Lecce approach; we do not dwell upon this
subject for the sake of brevity).
We have thus recovered within the Lecce approach a structure that is basic
in the BR approach. The above framework, however, introduces (via (viii)) a
typical feature of the former approach that neither occurs in the latter nor in
the standard interpretation of QM, that is, objectivity of properties. For, if an
extension ρj(E) is defined in every laboratory j for every property E, the out-
come of a registering device in E, when applied to a physical object x, does not
depend on the measurement context (it is yes iff x ∈ ρj(E)). In semantic terms,
one can say that the truth value of a statement of the form E(x) that attributes
the property E to the physical object x is semantically defined (E(x) is true
iff x ∈ ρj(E)), independently of any theoretical or experimental procedure that
may lead to know it, hence also in those physical situations in which the physical
theory (QM in our case) states that it is impossible to predict it theoretically
or to attain empirical knowledge of it by means of suitable measurements. In
this semantic sense, which avoids any ontological commitment, properties are
objective according to the Lecce approach (hence the ensuing interpretation of
QM has been called Semantic Realism, or SR, interpretation). Of course, objec-
tivity of properties implies that the SR interpretation clashes with the standard
interpretation, which asserts instead nonobjectivity of properties on the basis of
empirical (e.g., the double–slit experiment) or theoretical (e.g., the no–go the-
orems mentioned in footnote 1) arguments. Hence, the SR interpretation was
worked out together with an accurate analysis of those arguments, which sin-
gled out some weaknesses in each of them [25, 29, 30]. In particular, theoretical
arguments in favor of nonobjectivity turn out to be based on implicit assump-
tions that, when made explicit, are rather doubtful. Indeed, these assumptions
subtend an epistemological perspective that assumes the validity of empirical
quantum laws also in physical situations in which QM itself states that, in prin-
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ciple, they cannot be checked. If this perspective is criticized,6 nonobjectivity of
properties appears as an interpretative choice, not a logical consequence of the
theory, and alternative interpretations become possible. Among these, the SR
interpretation restores objectivity without requiring any change in the mathe-
matical apparatus and in the minimal (statistical) interpretation of QM.
5 The subentity problem within the Lecce ap-
proach
The crucial feature of objectivity of properties within the SR interpretation
(which was introduced to avoid a number of problems and paradoxes following
from the standard interpretation of QM, among which, in particular, the diffi-
culties in the quantum theory of measurement [30]) suggests a natural solution
of the subentity problem that is surprisingly similar to the solution propounded
by the BR approach in a different framework. Let us discuss it proceeding again
by steps.
(i) States and properties have different operational definitions (see (iii) and
(vi)) and their extensions have different features (see (v), (viii) and (ix)) which
implies that they must be carefully distinguished from a physical viewpoint (this
distinction also occurs within the BR approach). In particular, one can never
recognize the unknown state of a physical object x by means of a registration
procedure, just as in standard QM, where an ideal measurement puts x in a fi-
nal state but provides only limited information on the initial state of x. On the
contrary, objectivity of properties implies that it is possible to discover whether
x possesses or not a property E by using a registering device r ∈ E (of course,
x possesses E iff the registration yields outcome yes), at variance with stan-
dard QM, where an ideal measurement actualizes the measured property, that
generally is neither possessed nor not possessed by x before the measurement.
(ii) It follows from (i) that the probability of finding a given result when per-
forming a measurement on a physical object x can be interpreted as expressing
our ignorance about the properties possessed by x (in this sense one can say that
it is epistemic) within the Lecce approach, whatever the state of the physical
object may be. The distinction between pure and nonpure states may still be
6We remind that the criticism is based on a new epistemological perspective according
to which the theoretical laws of any physical theory are considered as mathematical schemes
from which empirical laws can be deduced. The latter laws are assumed to be valid in all
those physical situations in which they can be experimentally checked, while no assumption
of validity can be done in physical situations in which some general principle prohibits one to
check them (this position is consistent, in particular, with the operational and antimetaphys-
ical attitude of standard QM). In classical physics the new perspective does not introduce
any substantial change, since there is no physical situation in which an empirical law cannot,
in principle, be tested. On the contrary, if boundary, or initial, conditions are given in QM
attributing noncompatible properties to the physical system (more precisely, to a sample of
it), a physical situation is hypothesized that is not empirically accessible, hence no assumption
of validity can be done for the empirical laws deduced from the general formalism of QM in
this situation. Strangely enough, this new perspective is sufficient to invalidate the proof the
no-go theorems mentioned in footnote 1.
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introduced basing on the different values of the probabilities of the properties
in these states, but not on different interpretations (epistemic or not) of the
probabilities themselves. In particular, one can accept the standard represen-
tation of states by means of density operators, and characterize pure states as
the states whose representing density operators reduce to projection operators.
(iii) We have carefully avoided to classify nonpure states as mixtures in (ii).
In order to understand the reasons of this choice, let us remind that every
state is operationally interpreted as an equivalence class of preparing devices
in Sec. 4, (iii). If one considers a state S represented by the density operator∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi|, an ensemble of physical objects in the state S can be realized by
a mixed preparing device, i.e., a device that mixes physical objects prepared
by devices belonging to the states S1, S2, . . . represented by the projection
operators |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, . . . , respectively. In this case a coefficient pi cannot
only be interpreted as in (ii), but also as the probability that a given physical
object in the state S actually is in the state Si. Nevertheless, there is no evident
physical reason, according to the Lecce approach, for assuming that S contains
only mixed preparing devices. If this assumption is avoided, referring to S as a
mixed state would be misleading.
(iv) It follows from (iii) that in the case of compound physical systems the
density operators obtained by performing partial traces can be accepted as rep-
resenting states in which also preparations occur that are not mixed in the sense
specified in (iii). Whether these states must be considered “pure” (as in the BR
approach) or “nonpure” (as in (iii)) is a matter of convention.
(v) One can now incorporate the BR definition of subentity within the Lecce
approach by simply substituting (Σ,L, ξ, κ) and (Σ′,L′, ξ′, κ′) with (S, E , Et,Sy)
and (S ′, E ′, E ′t,S ′y), respectively, in Definition 3. Then, let Ω and Ω′ be two quan-
tum entities associated with the Hilbert spaces H and H′, and described by the
state property systems (S, E , Et,Sy) and (S ′, E ′, E ′t,S ′y), respectively. Moreover,
suppose that Ω is a subsystem of Ω′, so that H′ = H ⊗ G (where G is also a
Hilbert space), and denote by SW , EP , S
′
W ′ , E
′
P ′ , the state of Ω represented by
the density operator W on H, the property of Ω represented by the projection
operator P on H, the state of Ω′ represented by the density operator W ′ on
H′ and the property of Ω′ represented by the projection operator P ′ on H′,
respectively. The mappings m : S′W ′ ∈ S ′ → SW ∈ S such that W = TrGW ′
(where TrG is the partial trace of W
′ with respect to the subentity associated
with the Hilbert space G), and n : EP ∈ E → E′P ′ ∈ E ′ such that P ′ = P ⊗ IG
(where IG is the identity in G) can easily be proved to satisfy the conditions in
Definition 3. Thus, Ω is a subentity of Ω′ and the subentity problem is solved
within the Lecce approach.
The above solution can be compared with the solution proposed in Sec. 3.
It is then apparent that the two solutions are compatible, apart from the con-
vention defining the class of pure states. This result seems to us very interesting
since it enhances the reliability of both solutions and may lead one to consider
more carefully the proposal of broadening standard QM that comes out from
the BR and the Lecce approach.
It remains to stress that the probabilistic definition of states in Sec. 4, (iii)
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(which is usual in the literature on the foundations of QM and not specific of the
Lecce approach [18]) groups together, in the case of nonpure states, mixed with
nonmixed preparing devices, that therefore cannot be distinguished by means of
measurements. This explains the deep roots of the indistinguishability problem
mentioned in Sec. 3, (iii). Moreover, it opens the way to a possible solution
of the problem of explaining how both unitary and nonunitary evolutions may
occur for the same density operator (see again, Sec. 3, (iii)). Indeed, it suggests
distinguishing mixed from nonmixed preparing devices by introducing a new
equivalence relation on Π, strictly contained in the physical equivalence relation
defined in Sec. 4, (iii). Thus every state S would be associated with a family
of hidden states (which seemingly introduces a kind of hidden variables theory;
there are however some important peculiarities that we cannot discuss here, see,
e.g., [31]). These would be equivalent with respect to measurements but could
have different behaviours with respect to time evolution.
The above suggestion seems especially suitable for concluding this paper.
Indeed, it provides a natural support to Aerts’ proposals in Sec. 3, (iii), which
again shows similarities between the BR and the Lecce approaches, notwith-
standing their remarkable differences.
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